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I. INTRODUCTION
Multinational corporations (MNCs)' exist in a vacuum ofenvironmen-
tal liability. Host states, typically developing nations, rarely have the
environmental laws in place needed to remedy the vast quantity of damage
many corporations inflict. Further, since developing countries are typically
dependent on the MNCs located within their borders, even if they did have
the structure in place to prosecute the corporations for environmental
wrongdoing, they would probably be unwilling to do so, for fear of losing
such an important economic asset. Therefore, the United States should
apply existing environmental statutes extraterritorially for foreign plaintiffs
seeking redress for environmental wrongs MNCs commit abroad. This
prospect has recently become somewhat of a reality; however, significant
I A multinational corporation is a "national company in two or more countries operating in
association, with one controlling the other in whole or in part." THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHICS
OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 30 (1992).
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barriers remain in place that prevent the total vindication of foreign victims
of environmental abuse.
The number of MNCs has increased dramatically over the second half
of the twentieth century.2 Their numbers will continue to rise as long as
"trade barriers diminish, communications systems improve, and transporta-
tion becomes cheaper and more efficient. ' Forty-one percent of MNCs
conduct some part of their operations in developing nations.4 In those
developing nations, MNCs function in a myriad of"pollution-intensive and
hazardous industries," which have the potential to harm the environment
and human health?5 MNCs also participate in industries that develop
natural resources, such as "mining, petroleum, and agri-business," all of
which have the capability of endangering environmentally sensitive areas,6
such as the rainforest. The World Bank conducted a study on MNCs,
which concluded "polluting industry activities are being dispersed interna-
tionally, [but] the dispersion is greatest in the direction of developing
countries."7
MNCs control the economy of many of the developing nations in
which they operate, as they are often the primary source of income for the
state.8 However, a MNCs top priority is generally the "financial health of
the corporation and its shareholders, [not the] environmental needs of the
host country." 9 In accordance with these priorities, MNCs then commit
acts, which, if performed in the United States, would be considered illegal,
2 Joshua P. Eaton, The Nigerian Tragedy, Environmental Regulation ofTransnational Corporations, and
the Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 261,262 (1997).
3 Id. at 263.
4 U.N. Conference on Trade and Dev., Programme on Transnational Corporations, World
Investment Report 1993: Transnational Corporations and Integrated International Production at 19-22,
U.D. Doc ST/CTC/15b, U.N. Sales No. E.93.II.A.14 (1993).
s RobertJ. Fowler, International Environmental Standardsfor Transnational Corporations, 25 ENVTL.
L. 1, 8 (Winter, 1995).
6 Id. Today, an increasing number of countries are exporting increased amounts of hazardous
waste for disposal in foreign nations. Lauren Levy, Stretching Environmental Statutes to Include Private Causes
ofAction and Extraterritorial Application: Can It Be Done?, 6 DICK.J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y65 (Winter, 1997).
Recent changes in the domestic waste disposal markets of the world's industrialized nations, "including
increased waste generation, reduced disposal capacity, tighter regulation of the environment, increased
disposal costs, and greater public concern over the disposal of hazardous wastes, have stimulated the
export of hazardous waste for disposal." Id.
7 Patrick Low & Alexander Years, Do "Dirty" Industries Migrate?, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
THE ENVIRONMENT 89, 88 (World Bank Discussion Papers, No. 159) (1992).
8 Scott Holwick, Note & Comment, Trausnational Corporate Behavior and Its Disparate and Unjust
Effeas on the Indigenous Cultures and the Environment of Developing Nations: Jota v. Texaco, A Case Study, 11
COLO.J. INT'LENVTL. L. & POL'Y 183, 192 (Winter, 2000).
9 Id. at 192.
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including those that destroy the environment.'0 These actions in turn
"threaten indigenous cultures, unique ecosystems, and many people's
lives.""
To exacerbate the situation, MNCs escape liability under international
law, as treaties or other international agreements, which are written to
guarantee the rights of nations, do not regulate MNCs. 2 Furthermore,
those corporate codes of conduct on environmental protection that do exist
are insufficient, as they typically require only "self-regulation, and thus
capture only the lowest common denominator of a duty of care."' 3 Finally,
host governments must struggle to balance the economic and environmental
needs of the country. 4 When the host governments attempt to negotiate
with MNCs about environmental regulations, and industrial and pollution
practices, the MNCs possess an enormous amount of negotiating leverage
due to their ability to simply leave that country for another with more
favorable regulations.'" In fact, developing countries may "ease, or fail to
increase, domestic environmental controls to prevent polluting industries
from migrating,"' 6 for fear of losing the income they generate for the host
government.
Regulation ofMNCs by foreign states is even more difficult, "not solely
for lack of will, but also for lack of capacity." 7 The United States has the
capability to do so, although it is reluctant to enforce its regulations for a
multitude of reasons. Very few domestic statutes explicitly state that they
are meant to be applied extraterritorially, and there is a general presumption
against extraterritorial application without express intent from Congress.
Furthermore, none ofthese statutes attempts to regulate the environmental
practices ofMNCs operating in foreign countries.'8 Thus, since MNCs are
not subject to international agreements, and the host country rarely imposes
its own regulations, U.S. corporations are "essentially able to operate in a
completely lawless manner."' 9 If U.S. environmental statutes are applied
10 Gregory GA. Tzeutschler, Note, Corporate Violator: The Alien Tort Liability of Transnational
Corporations for Human Rights Abuses Abroad, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 359, 361 (Spring, 1999).
11 Id. at 361-62.
12 Holwick, supra note 8, at 193.
13 Id.
14 Id.
1 Id.
16 Fowler, supra note 5, at 16.
17 Holwick, supra note 8, at 193.
IS Mark Gibney & R. David Emerick, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Law and the
Protection of Human Rights: Holding Multinational Corporations to Domestic and International Standards, 10
TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 139 (Spring, 1996).
19 Id.
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extraterritorially, MNCs will no longer be able to operate without fear of
liability.
Hl. GENERAL EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF STATUTES &
RELEVANT CASE LAW
The Supreme Court has gone through several stages in interpreting the
extraterritorial application of statutes, beginning in the early 1900s. The
mode of thinking has shifted from essentially denying all extraterritorial
statutory applications because of their foreign affairs implications, to
presumptions against statutory application without express intent from
Congress, to its current application - a presumption against extraterritorial-
ity, with many exceptions.
A. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.
20
American Banana was one of the first U.S. cases to examine the
extraterritorial application of domestic statutes. In American Banana, the
Costa Rican government seized banana plantations, which were owned by
a U.S. corporation in Panama-American Banana.21 American Banana then
filed suit against its rival, United Fruit, another U.S. corporation operating
in the area, for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act and damage inflicted
upon the business, alleging it solicited the Costa Rican government to seize
the plantation, railway, and supplies in a conspiracy to force the plaintiff out
of business. 22 The Supreme Court found the injury to the plaintiff
unactionable under U.S. law.
23
The Court considered prior case law on the extraterritorial application
of laws to the high seas, legislative intent, the doctrine of comity,24 and tort
law.25 Furthermore, it reasoned that since the government of Costa Rica
condoned the acts, albeit instigated by United Fruit, any interference by the
U.S., or application of U.S. laws, would violate Costa Rica's sovereignty.
26
The Court also added that whether an act was lawful was something that
20 Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
21 Id. at 354.
2 Id. at 354-55.
23 Id. at 359.
24 The doctrine of comity, or deference to other nation's sovereignty, is discussed in detail in
Part V(B) of this comment. See infra notes 289-300 and accompanying text.
25 See generally, American Banana, 213 U.S. 347.
26 Id. at 356.
2002]
398 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 10:393
needed to be determined in the country where the act was committed.
27
Finally, the Court noted that, in cases where there is ambiguity, or no
indication at all from Congress, a statue should be "confined in its operation
and effect to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power."28 This holding against the extraterritorial application of
statutes became the pillar for assessment of extraterritorial antitrust law for
the next thirty-five years.2
B. Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo 3
Another case of importance in the area of extraterritorial application of
U.S. laws is Foley. In Foley, an American citizen working in the Middle East
alleged his employer, an American contractor operating under the U.S.
government to build public works there, failed to adhere to the Eight-Hour
Law.31 The Supreme Court applied a three-prong test to determine whether
Congress intended the statute to be applied extraterritorially. First, the
Court explained that Congress intends for all U.S. laws to apply only
domestically, unless there is express intent in the language of the statute
mandating its application abroad.32  The Eight-Hour Law had no such
expression.33 Second, the legislative history of the law showed no evidence
Congress had implied intent for its extraterritorial application.34 Finally,
administrative interpretations of the law also showed no indication it should
be applied outside of the United States.35 The Court concluded the law
should not be applied extraterritorially, and ensconced the presumption
against extraterritorial application of statutes "as a canon of statutory
construction."
36
27 Id. at 357-58.
28 Id. at 357.
29 Lee I. Raikan, Extraterritorial Application of RCRA: Is Its Exportability Going to Waste?, 12 VA.
ENVrL. L.J. 573, 591 (Summer, 1993).
30 Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949).
31 Id. at 283. The Eight-Hour Law is set forth in 40 U.S.C.S. SS 321-326 (2002), and limits the
regular work day to eight hours. Filardo was hired as a cook for the construction site, and demanded
he be paid overtime for the days he worked in excess ofeight hours. Foley Brothers refused, and Filardo
filed suit.
32 Id. at 285.
33 Id. at 286.
3 Id. at 287-88.
35 Id. at 288.
3 Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against
Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 598,607 (Winter, 1990).
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C. Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A3 7
In Benz, the Supreme Court found the Labor Management Relations
Act of 1947 did not apply to damages caused by union members picketing
a foreign ship, operated entirely by foreign seamen, while temporarily in an
American port.38  Losses suffered during the two months of picketing,
therefore, were not recoverable under U.S. law.39 The Court examined the
language of the Act itself, as well as the legislative history to ascertain
congressional intent. The Court combined two different approaches to
determining the extraterritoriality of the statute.4° By first looking to the
language and legislative history of the Act, the Court adopted the "clear
indication by Congress" test.4 Findingthe Act lacking congressional intent,
the Court then performed "a functional balancing test," similar to the one
used in American Banana, which took into consideration the lack of
"American connections and interests in the case"2 and the "delicate field of
international relations."43
D. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras"0
McCulloch furthered Supreme Court theory on extraterritorial applica-
tion of statutes. The Court held the National Labor Relations Act did not
apply to vessels sailing between the U.S. and Latin America.45 The ships in
question were owned by a foreign subsidiary of an American corporation,
flew flags of foreign nations, and operated by a foreign crew.46 The Court,
37 Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138 (1957).
38 Id. at 139. The picketing went through four distinct segments: the first was instigated over
a wage dispute, after which the Master discharged everyone who went on strike, and lasted approximately
two weeks; the second strike included the Sailor's Union of the Pacific and the striking crew, and lasted
approximately three weeks; third, the local chapter of the National Organization of Masters, Mates and
Pilots (NOMMP) set up their picket line, which lasted approximately two months; fourth, the Atlantic
and Gulf Coast District ofthe NOMMP picketed for two days, until forced to leave under an injunction.
Id. at 140. "None of the crew were members of any of the three unions" picketing. Id. at n.3.
39 See generally, id.
40 Suzanne B. Krolikowski, A Sovereign in a Sovereigniess Land? The Extraterritorial Application of
Untied States Law: EDF v. Massey, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 333, 338 (Winter, 1994).
41 Id.
42 Id. Neither the boat, nor the crew were American; they simply happened to be at a U.S. port.
Benz, 353 U.S. at 142.
43 Id. at 147.
44 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
45 Id. at 21-22.
46 Id. at 12.
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similar to its analysis in Benz, examined the statutory language and the
legislative history of the Act. 47 The Court also emphasized the relatively
minor U.S. connection, the policy that the U.S. "should not become
involved in the internal affairs of foreign flag ships," as to do otherwise may
violate a treaty, and held that to apply U.S. law to the ships would conflict
with Honduran law.48
The Court, in Benz and McCulloch, applied a broader approach to
determining the extraterritorial application of a statute than in previous
cases.49 In some ways, the new test could be construed as more strict,
because not only did the Court look to the statute's language and legislative
history, it also considered the foreign policy implications.50
E. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission v. Arabian Ameri-
can Oil Co. (Aramco)5'
In Aramco, the Supreme Court also addresses the extraterritorial
application of U.S. laws. InAramco, an American citizen, Boureslan, worked
for an American corporation abroad. 2 Allegedly, during his four years of
employment abroad before being discharged, he was harassed because of his
race and religion. 3 Boureslan filed a petition with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and in Texas (Arabian Oil's place of
business) state court, under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 The
Court again, as in Foley, looked to the language, legislative history, and
administrative interpretations of the Act to determine if Congress intended
it to be applied extraterritorially, concluding it did not. 5 Then, relying on
Benz and McCulloch, the Court rationalized that to uphold the claim would
interfere with an issue governed by another country's laws and policies.5 6
However, much of the insight in Aramco comes from the strong dissent
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. They argued that the
presumption against extraterritorial application was simply that - a
presumption - and not a clear rule, as the majority indicated. 7 The dissent
47 Krolikowski, supra note 40, at 338.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 339.
50 Id.
51 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
52 Id. at 247.
53 Id.
54 Id.
5s Id. at 248, 246-47.
% Id. at 255.
57 Id. at 261.
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explained the two different categories of presumptions against extraterritori-
ality: the strict rule, requiring clear congressional statement before applying
domestic policy to an issue that may have foreign policy implications, such
as in Benz and McCulloch; and the weaker rule, which does not take into
account sensitive issues of foreign affairs, such as in Foley?8 The dissent
argued that since extraterritorial application of Title VII would not affect the
sovereignty of other nations, the weaker Foley test should have been used. 9
The Aramco decision "established a significant threshold that must be
satisfied before reaching more substantive and subjective tests" ofextraterri-
toriality.60
F. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey
6
'
After Aramco, it seemed clear that the test for whether a statute should
be applied extraterritorially was dependent upon Congress making a clear
statement of intent for such application. However, the strong dissent and
Congress's reaction6 2 to the opinion seems to leave open this question.
Although not a Supreme Court case, Massey sheds light on the principles of
extraterritorial application post-Aramco. The D.C. Circuit, in addressingthe
extraterritorial application of the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) 63 in Antarctica, described three exceptions to the presumption
against extraterritoriality.64 The court indicated the exceptions it was
considering were well established in previous case law; however, the earlier
cases did not explicitly describe any of the exceptions. 6 The "court's
exceptions are actually an interpretation and distillation of the pre-Aramco
case law, brought together in a cohesive manner. "66 Hence, the case's
enlightening effect on the presumption against extraterritoriality.
58 Id. at 265.
59 Id. at 265-66.
60 Raikan, supra note 29, at 584.
61 Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Massey, 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
6 Congress later amended the Civil Rights Act to ensure its extraterritorial application to
American citizens.
6 42 U.S.C.S. § 4321-4370 (2002).
64 The lower court denied the request, explaining NEPA does apply extraterritorially, despite
the broad language Congress used to describe the statute's purpose. The lower court also failed to
examine the legislative history of the Act, although they relied on Aramco for their reasoning.
65 Krolikowski, supra note 40, at 348.
66 Id.
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1. CLEAR INTENT EXCEPTION
The D.C. Circuit court relied explicitly on Aramco in formulating this
exception, stating, "the presumption [against extraterritoriality] will not
apply where there is an 'affirmative intention of... Congress clearly ex-
pressed' to extend the scope of the statute to conduct occurringwithin other
sovereign nations."67 Thus, a court should not contravene Congress's intent
to apply a statute extraterritorially. 68 Conversely, a court should not apply
a statute extraterritorially if the statute is ambiguous regarding its reach.69
2. ADVERSE EFFECTS EXCEPTION
The second exception is involved "where the failure to extend the scope
of the statute to a foreign setting will result in adverse effects within the
United States."70  The court extrapolated this exception from previous
Supreme Court cases that permitted the "application of a statute
extraterritorially when there would have been effects within the U.S.
borders if the statute was not applied."7'
3. LOCATION OF CONDUCT EXCEPTION
The final exception is implicated when the "conduct regulated by the
government occurs within the United States. ,72 The court extended this to
include instances where the significant effects of the conduct are felt outside
of the U.S., as long as the conduct itself largely takes place within the
United States.73 This "raises the threshold question of whether the action
is [actually] extraterritorial in nature."74 The presumption against a statute
of this nature's extraterritoriality is not exercised unless foreign policy
implications are present.75  Thus, "executive, legislative, and agency
decisions [that] take place in the United States would fall under this
67 Massey, 986 F.2d at 531 (citingAramco, 499 U.S. 244, quoting Benz, 353 U.S. at 147).
68 Kourtney Twenhafel, Comment, Freeport McMoran's Midas Touch: Testing the Application of the
National EnvironmentalPolicyAc to FederalAgencyAcaion GoverningMultinational Corporations, 4TUL.J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 303, 309 (Summer, 1996).
69 Id.
70 Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
71 Krolikowski, supra note 40, at 348.
72 Massey, 986 F.2d at 531.
73 Id.
74 Twenhafel, supra note 68, at 311.
75 Id.
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exception, subject to the first two exceptions, as would the actions of aMNC.
The court held the incinerator proposed for use in Antarctica fell under
the ambit of the location of conduct exception, requiring an Environmental
Impact Statement (EIS) before implementation. 77 The court explained that
since NEPA was intended to apply to a federal agency's decisionmaking
process, and agency decisions are typically made in the U.S., the actual
conduct NEPA regulates often occurs in the U.S. as well.78 The court also
explained Antarctica presented a unique problem in that it is not under the
sovereign rule of any one particular nation. 79 This eliminated any conflict
of laws or analysis of effects on foreign affairs tests typically applicable to
determining whether a statute should be applied extraterritorially. The
sovereignless exception has been referred to as the implied fourth exception to
the presumption against extraterritoriality.8°  Furthermore, the court
considered Congress's concern about worldwide problems, indicated in the
language of the statute.8' The court's approach in Massey seems to move
away from the Aramco rules of extraterritoriality and return to the weaker
standard, as used in Foley. Although the explicit descriptions of exceptions
to the presumption against extraterritoriality are helpful to understanding
the doctrine, the conflict between the process used in deciding the Massey
case and the process used in Aramco only illuminate the disparity in
interpretation and application of the presumption.
G. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. CaliforniaP
In the same year as the Massey decision, the Supreme Court addressed
extra-territoriality yet again in Hartford Fire. The Court, in analyzing the
antitrust claims, abandoned the interest-balancing test cemented in the
Restatementa3 shortly before the decision, indicating balancing should only
be applied in instances where there is "a true conflict between domestic and
foreign law."" The case involved several U.S. states and private parties who
76 Id.
77 NEPA requires all federal agencies complete an EIS before implementing any "major Federal
actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." 42 U.S.C.S. § 4332(2)(C) (2002).
78 Massey, 986 F.2d 528, 532-33.
7 Id. at 529.
8D Krolikowski, supra note 40, at 347,349. Additionally, this exception may be construed so as
to control the government's actions in outer space, or on the high seas.
81 Massey, 986 F.2d at 532-33.
82 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
8 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987).
84 HarfordFire, 509 U.S. at 799. Atrue conflictwould onlyexist when the U.S. party is required
2002]
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sued a London-based insurance firm for refusing to offer reinsurance to
cover pollution damage claims.85 The defendants did not deny the conduct,
which primarily took place in England, and instead argued it was legal under
English law.86 The Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, finding no true
conflict existed.8Y Hartford Fire "has left a troubling legacy . .. [leaving]
future lower courts [to] address the nature of a true conflict,"8 which was
not fully explained in the decision.
Ill. AREAS IN WHICH EXTRATERRITORIALITY IS SUPPORTED & WHY
Extraterritorial application of statutes is accomplished either through
Congress or the courts. In some instances, Congress has demonstrated
express intent for extraterritoriality, such as in legislation addressing
terrorism and clean air. The courts have found extraterritorial application
necessary for drug enforcement and copyright protection. Additionally,
both the courts and Congress have addressed the need for extraterritorial
application of security and antitrust statutes.
A. Congressional Intent for Extraterritorial Application
1. ANTI-TERRORISM
The Hostage Taking Act89 and the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism
Act 9° have express language indicating extraterritorial application is
appropriate.
The Hostage Taking Act provides:
by foreign law to violate U.S. law, or when it is impossible for the party to comply with the laws of both
the United States and the foreign state. Michael Wallace Gordon, United States Extraterritorial Subject
MatterJurisdiction in Securities Fraud Litigation, 10 FLA.J. INT'L L. 487, 507, n.92 (Spring/Summer, 1996).
True conflict is similar to, if not the same as, foreign compulsion theory. Under foreign
compulsion, a state would not require a person to act in a foreign state in a manner prohibited
by the law of the foreign state, or to refrain from acting in compliance with a requirement of
that foreign state. However reasonable it may sound, it has not been uniformly accepted or
applied.
See United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1034 (2d Cir. 1985) (rejecting foreign compulsion); United
States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 699 F.2d 341, 345-46 (7th Cir. 1983) (accepting foreign
compulsion).
8s Hartjord Fire, 509 U.S. at 764.
86 Id. at 798.
87 Id. at 799.
88 Gordon, supra note 84, at 509.
89 18 U.S.C.S. S 1203 (2002).
90 18 U.S.C.S. S 175 (2002).
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(a) [W]hoever, whether inside or outside the United States, seizes
or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain
another person in order to compel a third person or a governmental
organization to do or abstain from doing any act . . . shall be
punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
(b) it is not an offense under this section if the conduct required for
the offense occurred outside the United States unless:
(c) the offender or the person seized or detained is a national of the
United States;
(d) the offender is found in the United States; or
(e) the governmental organization sought to be compelled is the
government of the United States.9'
The Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act is even more explicit,
stating, "There is extraterritorial Federaljurisdiction over an offense under
this section committed by or against a national of the United States.'
2. CLEAN AIR
The Clean Air Act93 (CAA) has limited extraterritorial implications,
primarily addressing the acid rain problem suffered along the U.S.-
Canadian border. The language of the statute indicates intent to apply only
certain provisions extraterritorially. Section 7415 addresses the situation
caused when air emissions in the U.S. induce or contribute to air pollution
in foreign countries that "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare" in that country.' The CAA's extraterritoriality is
restrained, however, since only countries that offer reciprocal rights receive
the benefits of Section 7415. 5 Thus, the Act's extraterritoriality only applies
to a few nations.
91 18 U.S.C.S. S 1203 (2002).
92 18 U.S.C.S. S 175(a) (2002).
93 42 U.S.C.S. § 7401-7515 (2002).
94 42 U.S.C.S. S 7415(a) (2002), states:
Whenever the Administrator [of the EPA]... believes that any air pollutant or pollutants
emitted in the Untied States causes or contributes to air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country, [he or she] shall give
formal notification thereof to the Governor of the State in which such emissions originate.
9s Jeffrey B. Groy & Gail L. Wurtzler, International Implications of U.S. Environmental Law, 8 NAT.
RESOURCES &ENV'T. 7 (1993).
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B. Court-Derived Extraterritorial Application
1. COPYRIGHT
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.' is one of the few cases in which the Supreme
Court recognized the extraterritorial application of a statute, and is the
seminal case in extraterritorial application of copyright law. In Steele,
Bulova, an American corporation, sued a U.S. citizen for trademark
infringement and unfair competition that took place in Mexico 97 The
Court read the statute broadly, finding the U.S. could make laws that
governed its own citizens, even if their actions took place in another
country,' such as in the case at hand. The Court emphasized its ability to
make such laws, as long as they did not encroach upon the sovereignty of
another jurisdiction.99 Key to the decision was the fact that Mexico had
already ruled against the defendant and nullified his registration in
Mexico.'00 The Court concluded that since the U.S. had an interest in the
outcome as well, because some of the watches made in Mexico had found
their way into the U.S. stream of commerce, 1 and its decision would not
interfere with the sovereignty of another nation, °2 the finding of a copyright
violation would be upheld.
2. DRUG ENFORCEMENT
Drug enforcement is one area in which the courts have routinely applied
statutes extraterritorially. This is typicallyjustified under the adverse effects
or seriousness of the harm exception, although not typically referred to
explicitly.
9 Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
9 Id. at 281.
98 Id. at 283-84.
99 Id. at 285-86.
100 Id. at 288.
101 Id. at 286-87.
102 Id. at 289.
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a. United States v. Egan'0 3
Egan again looked at the seriousness of the harm to the United States in
determining whether a statute should be applied extraterritorially.""° In
Egan, the U.S. Coast Guard found marijuana on a ship forty miles south of
Long Island, beyond the U.S. territorial limit."'s The defendants were
indicted, although the applicable statutes showed no express intent to be
applied extraterritorially. °6 The court held the charges were valid,
reasoning that although the defendants were apprehended outside of the
U.S., the impact of their actions would have been felt inside.0 7
Furthermore, the court reasoned, in light of the drug problem plaguing the
U.S., drug smuggling was a threat to national security.
108
b. United States v. Benitez' °9
Benitez was a Colombian fugitive."' Benitez discovered two agents
conducting a Drug Enforcement Agency investigation in Columbia, held
them prisoner, and shot them repeatedly, although not fatally."' The U.S.
federal court rationalized jurisdiction was proper because the victims were
U.S. citizens." 2  Their status satisfied the conduct test." 3 In addition,
sufficient American interests existed because the operation had national
security implications, and was directly connected to the "governmental
functions of the nation."'
14
103 United States v. Egan, 501 F.Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
104 Joan R. Goldfarb, Extraterritorial Compliance With NEPAAmid the Current Wave ofEnvironmental
Alarm, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 543 (Spring, 1991).
10s Egan, 501 F.Supp. at 1256.
106 Id. at 1256, 1258.
107 Id. at 1257-61.
108 Goldfarb, supra note 104, at 550.
109 United States v. Benitz, 741 F.2d 1312 (1 lth Cir. 1984).
110 Id.
III Id. at 1315.
112 Lea Brilmayer&Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and FifthAmendment Due Process, 105
HARV. L. REv. 1217, 1255 (April, 1992).
113 Id.
114 Id.
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c. United States v. Noriega"
15
General Noriega was indicted by a federal grand jury in Miami, Florida
for racketeering and various drug law violations. 16 Almost two years later,
U.S. troops were sent into Panama City to seize Noriega ."' The court
found jurisdiction under the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws,
reasoning that, "even if extraterritorial conduct produces no effect in the
U.S., a defendant can still be reached if he intended to produce an effect in the
U.S., or is part of a conspiracy in which some co-conspirator's activities
occurred in American territory."118
C. Both Congressional and Court-Enforced Areas of Extraterritoriality
1. SECURITIES
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1933119 to guarantee
fair play in the securities market. The Act specifically governs foreign
securities exchanges as well as domestic. The language of the statute
provides in part:
The provisions of this chapter or of any rule or regulation
thereunder shall not apply to any person insofar as he transacts a
business in securities without thejurisdiction of the United States,
unless he transacts such business in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or
appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.' 20
Additionally, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA)121
prohibits bribery of foreign government officials by U.S. citizens subject to
thejurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange Commission.2 2 The FCPA
115 United States v. Noriega, 746 F.Supp. 1506 (S.D. Fla. 1990).
116 Id. at 1510.
117 Id. at 1511.
118 Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 112, at 1257 (emphasis added).
119 15 U.S.C.S. SS 77b-m (2002).
120 15 U.S.C.S. S 78dd(b) (2002). However, courts have declined to apply this provisions as
broadly as the language implicates, finding extraterritoriality in only the most narrow of circumstances.
121 15 U.S.C.S. SS 78m(a)-(h) (2002).
122 Id. at S 78m(a), 78b(6).
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also applies to non-U.S. companies who either issue securities in the United
States, or are subsidiaries of a U.S. company. 12
3
a. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook
124
Schoenbaum involved a stockholder's derivative action on behalf of a
Canadian corporation.'2 5 The plaintiffs, suing under U.S. securities laws,
alleged the defendants knew of oil discoveries and the consequent increase
in stock value, but conspired and sold the stock at very low prices to
"affiliates, business associates, and friends. " 126 These actions affected the
price of the stock on the American Stock Exchange (ASE), thereby causing
harmful effects in the United States to American citizens buying foreign
stocks listed on the ASE.127 The court concluded the only way to protect
these American investors would be through extraterritorial application of
U.S. securities regulations.' 28 The court "extracted jurisdiction from the
express purposes of the Act, recognizing the congressional intent to protect
national public interests." 129
b. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone' 3°
In Bersch, a Canadian corporation that sold and managed mutual funds
was accused of misrepresentation and omissions in prospectuses used in
offering stock.' 3' Bersch, an American citizen, sued, alleging some of the
preparatory acts for the fraud were committed inside the United States,
although the fraud itself occurred outside of its borders. 32 The appellate
court ruled the acts were in and of themselves not of a sufficient magnitude
to justify jurisdiction, but since the effects of the fraud were borne by U.S.
citizens, jurisdiction was proper.33 The court acknowledged that its
interpretation of the law might extend the scope to greater or less than what
123 Robert A. Bassett, Canadian Companies Beware: The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices ActApplies to
You!, 36 ALBERTA L. REv. 455, 458 (1998).
124 Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
125 Id. at 217.
126 Id. at 218.
127 Raikan, supra note 29, at 603.
1258 Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 219.
129 Raikan, supra note 29, at 603.
130 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018
(1975).
131 Id. at 974, 978.
132 Id. at 974, 985.
133 Id. at 987, 992-94.
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Congress intended, but its decision was based on its "bestjudgment as to
what Congress would have wished if these problems had occurred to it."
134
c. SEC v. Kasser
135
Two corporations, one American, the other Canadian, accused Kasser,
a U.S. citizen, of fraud and misrepresentation regarding a Canadian
incorporated fund, owned by a Canadian province, in Ksser.136  The
fraudulent inducement led to the bankruptcy of the two companies. 137 The
SEC sought an injunction against Kasser, and the court found jurisdiction
since significant conduct occurred in the United States. 3 ' The court
followed the reasoning used in a prior case (lIT v. Vencap,)'39 which
distinguished itself from Bersch by stating, "Our ruling on this basis of
jurisdiction is limited to the perpetration of fraudulent acts themselves, and
does not extend to mere preparatory activities, or the failure to prevent
fraudulent acts, where the bulk of the activity was performed in foreign
countries, such as in Bersch."
40
The disparity between Bersch and Kasser illustrates the different
applications of the conduct test among different circuit courts, especially in
the securities context.'
41
2. ANTITRUST
Multiple U.S. statutes grant extraterritorial jurisdiction over antitrust
suits, including the Sherman Antitrust Act, 42 the Wilson Tariff Act,143 and
the Clayton Act.' 44 However, the majority of extraterritorial antitrust suits
and prosecutions are brought under the Sherman Act, and occasionally
under the Wilson Act. 4 The Clayton Act is not often utilized, as its various
134 Gordon, supra note 84, at 516.
135 SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1977).
136 Id. at 111.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 110-12.
139 liT v. Vencap, 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975), on remand at 411 F.Supp. 1094.
140 Id. at 1016-17.
141 Raikan, supra note 29, at 608.
142 15 U.S.C.S. SS 1-7 (2002).
143 15 U.S.C.S. SS 8-11 (2002).
144 15 U.S.C.S. § 12-27 (2002).
145 RussellJ. Davis, Annotation, ExtraterritorialApplication of Federal Antitrust Laws to Aas Occurring
in Foreign Commerce, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 343, n.1 (2001).
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substantive provisions are not phrased as broadly as the jurisdictionalprovision. 46
0 The first two sections of the Sherman Antitrust Act provide as
follows:
1. Restraint of trade; resale price maintenance; penalty
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal....
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be
punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars ifa corporation,
or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said
punishments, in the discretion of the court.
147
2. Monopolization; penalty
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony,
and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three
years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."
* The two salient portions of the Wilson Act provide:
1. Trusts in restraint of import trade illegal; penalty
Every combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract is
declared to be contrary to public policy, illegal, and void when the
same is made by or between two or more persons or corporations
146 Kintner and Hallgarten, Application of United States Antitrust Laws to Foreign Trade and Commerce
- Variations on American Banana since 1909, 15 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 343 (Nov. 1973).
147 15 U.S.C.S. S 1 (2002).
148 Id. at S 2.
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either of whom, as agent or principal, is engaged in importing any
article from any foreign country into the United States, and when
such combination, conspiracy, trust, agreement, or contract is
intended to operate in restraint of lawful trade, or free competition
in lawful trade or commerce, or to increase the market price in any
part of the United States of any article or articles imported or
intended to be imported into the United States, or of any
manufacture into which such imported article enters or is intended
to enter. Every person who is or shall hereafter be engaged in the
importation of goods or any commodity from any foreign country
in violation of this section of this Act, or who shall combine or
conspire with another to violate the same, is guilty of a
misdemeanor, and on conviction thereof in any court of the United
States such person shall be fined in a sum not less than one hundred
dollars and not exceeding five thousand dollars, and shall be further
punished by imprisonment, in the discretion of the court, for a term
not less than three months nor exceeding twelve months.'49
2. Jurisdiction of courts; duty of United States attorneys; procedure
The several [circuit courts] district courts of the United States are
hereby invested with jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations
of section seventy-three of this Act and it shall be the duty of the
several [district attorneys of the United States] United States
attorneys, in their respective districts, under the direction of the
Attorney General, to institute proceedings in equity to prevent and
restrain such violations .... s0
° The Clayton Antitrust Act provides as follows:
1. Suits by persons injured
[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor
in any district court of the United States in the district in which the
defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the
amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
149 Id. at § 8.
ISO Id. at § 9.
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him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
fee. 1
51
a. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa)152
The Second Circuit decided Alcoa, the first case addressing the
extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law. 53 Aluminum Company
was accused of monopolizing interstate and foreign commerce, specifically
in the manufacture and sale ofvirgin aluminum ingot.' The court applied
a lengthy reasoning test to whether a monopoly was present, and concluded
it was.15s Aluminum Company was also accused of forming an illegal
subsidiary corporation in Canada, which then conspired with European
aluminum producers to set prices.1 6 The court concluded U.S. antitrust
laws applied to the Canadian corporation, although no American agent was
involved in price fixing. 
5 7
The court based this conclusion on the presumption that the price fixing
had both intended to affect and did affect American commerce. 5 ' Judge
Learned Hand wrote the opinion, and utilized a two-part test, which
eventually became known as the effects test.' 9 The implementation of this
test by later courts permitted antitrust plaintiffs to file "suit when there is
almost any effect on U.S. commerce," and seemed to disregard foreign
affairs implications."
b. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Saben1
61
In Laker, several European airlines attempted to drive Laker Airways out
of the market, as it offered flights at a rate substantially lower than that set
15s Id. at § 15(a).
152 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. Ct. App. 1945).
1S3 The Supreme Court could not establish a quorum ofjustices who were not disqualified from
hearing the case, so they remanded the case to the Second Circuit on certification. J. ATWOOD & K
BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESs ABROAD 6.04 146 (2d ed. 1981).
154 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 421.
155 Id. at 423-39.
156 Id. at 440-41.
157 Id. at 444-45.
158 Id.
159 Raikan, supra note 29, at 592 ("As it evolved, this test was translated into various standards of
impact on the United States, including 'direct and substantial effect,' 'direct and influencing effect,' and
'intent and actual effect,' but few cases specific the standard's underlying components.").
160 Id.
161 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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by the International Air Transport Association. 62 Although Laker Airways
maintained operations for a few years, the price fixing, alleged commissions
paid to travel agents to send travelers to other airlines, and pressure put
upon lenders to withhold financing eventually took its toll, and Laker was
forced into liquidation.' 6' Laker sued under U.S. antitrust laws against a
number of foreign and domestic airlines."6 Several of the British airlines
filed for injunctions in British courts, which were awarded."6 Laker then
filed for injunctions in U.S. courts to prevent the remaining defendants
from exercising their right to file for injunctions in other countries.' 66 The
Laker court - after acknowledging the complexity of the case, its
manifestation of inherently conflicting domestic laws from several
countries, and the procedural difficulties intrinsic in cases involving
injunctions preventing access to courts of foreign jurisdiction - found the
effect on U.S. commerce substantial enough to warrant extraterritorial
application of U.S. antitrust laws. 67
c. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America' 6
In Timberlane, an American lumber company was attempting to expand
its business into Honduras by millingwood there and shipping it back to the
United States and Puerto Rico.' 69 Similar to the accusations in American
Banana, the plaintiff claimed the Bank of America, through its Honduras
subsidiaries and the Honduras government, were involved in a conspiracy
to shut the plaintiff out of Honduras.'70 The plaintiff filed suit under the
Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff Act, alleging the actions of the
defendants adversely affected competition in the United States.'7'
The court claimed the act of state doctrine illustrated inAmerican Banana
was not applicable to this case because Timberlane's facts were clearly
162 Id. at 916. The International Air Transport Association (IATA) was a "trade organization of
the world's largest air carriers" who met annually to set fares. Laker Airways' fares were approximately
one-third the price of those set by the IATA.
163 Id. at 917.
164 Id. at 915.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 918.
167 Id. at 916, 938.
168 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). The case was
remanded for further proceedings, which awarded more time for discovery, and was later dismissed for
inability to show a serious harm to U.S. commerce, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S.
1032 (1985).
169 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 601.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 600.
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distinguishable, and Honduras's sovereign acts were instigated by a private
individual. 72 The court then examined the case under the effects test,
stating that the "substantiality" element of the test was too arbitrary given
the requirements of comity.'73 The court then readdressed the principle of
comity by implementing ajurisdictional rule of reason, three-part test. The test
considered: first, the effects of the defendant's actions on United States
commerce; second, whether the scope of U.S. antitrust law covered the act
in question; and third, the interests of the U.S. in applying its antitrust law,
when balanced against the interests of the foreign nation. 74
The third prong of the Timberlane test exemplifies the "unique
contribution to the principle of extraterritorial application" this opinion
made.'75 Through utilization of a balancing test, the court "emphasized
strong antitrust enforcement, while at the same time assuring respect for the
legitimate concern of foreign states in guarding their sovereignty."
176
Federal courts remain divided overjurisdictional aspects of antitrust law,
between those still applyingthepure effects test and those using thejurisdictional
rule of reason test.177  Nevertheless, under either approach, "antitrust
jurisprudence still appears to be a champion of the expansive extraterritorial
application of U.S. law." 8
Based on the forgoing examples, it is clear courts have the ability to
authorize necessary extraterritorial regulation, even without clear
congressional intent, even when doing so may implicate foreign affairs
issues. However, the question of whether environmental regulation abroad
is necessary is yet to be answered definitively.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL STATUTES AND THEIR EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICABILITY
Courts have examined the extraterritoriality of a wide range of
environmental statutes sinceAramco, including the National Environmental
Policy Act, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the
Comprehensive Environmental Resource Control and Liability Act, the
Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
The results of these cases have varied. The diverse range of outcomes leaves
172 Id. at 608.
173 Id. at 610.
174 Id. at 613.
175 Raikan, supra note 29, at 596.
176 Id. at 596-97. "Timberlane quickly developed a following and is considered one of the most
influential antitrust standards in foreign commerce litigation." Id. at 597.
177 Id. at 599.
178 Id. at 600.
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the question ofextraterritorial application of environmental statutes ripe for
Supreme Court review.
A. The National Environmental Policy Act
Post-Massey, two cases have tested the waters as to the extraterritorial
application of NEPA."9  The results vacillated from complete
distinguishment based on the location of Massey (i.e. Antarctica), to full
extraterritorial application to any NEPA-implicated actions.
1. NEPA COATION OFJAPAN V. ASPINV80
Shortly after Massey, the D.C. District Court held the Defense
Department. need not prepare an EIS under NEPA for U.S. military
installations in Japan.' The court looked to the language of the statute
strictly, and emphasized the presumption against extraterritorial application
of statutes absent clear congressional intent.'s2 The court distinguished this
case from Massey by notingAntarctica was not a foreign country, but a global
common, analogous to outer space.
2. HRT V. RICHARDSON' 4
In Hirt, individuals sought a temporary restraining order and
preliminary injunction, alleging violations of NEPA, to prevent the
shipment of nuclear reactor material to Canada.' The plaintiffs claimed
the Department ofEnergy failed to complete an Environmental Assessment,
as required by law, which considered every aspect of the transfer.16 The
179 For the perspective on extraterritorial application of NEPA pre-Massey, see Sierra Club v.
Atomic Energy Comm'n, 433 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Comm. For Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg,
463 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1971); People ofEnewetak v. Laird, 353 F.Supp. 811 (Haw. D. 1973); People
of Saipan v. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1974); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 594 F.2d 1026
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Nat'l Org. for the Reform of Marijuana Laws v. U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 497 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Coleman, 421 F.Supp. 63 (D.C. D. 1976); Sierra Club v. Adams, 578
F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1978); NRDC v. NRC, 647 F.2d 1345 (D.C. Cir. 1981); and Greenpeace USA v.
Stone, 924 F.2d 175 (9th Cir. 1991).
180 NEPA Coalition ofJapan v. Aspin, 837 F.Supp. 466 (D.C. D. 1993).
181 Id. at 467.
182 Id. at 468.
183 Id. at 467.
184 Hirt v. Richardson, 127 F.Supp. 23 833 (W.D. Mich., SD 1999).
185 Id. at 837.
186 Id. The Department ofEnergy only analyzed the "fabrication and transport accident scenarios
for the American" mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, and did not consider the Russian fabrication of MOX,
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court held the facts of the Hirt case warranted the extraterritorial application
of NEPA, due mostly in part to the significant role the federal government
was to have in the transfer."s They also considered the cross-border affects
an accident would cause."s Nevertheless, the court contemplated these
factors in light of the "weighty considerations ofU.S. foreign policy, nuclear
non-proliferation, and the general interests of the Executive in carrying out
U.S. foreign policy," and declined to issue the injunction.'8 9
B. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)19°
RCRA governs hazardous waste from cradle to grave; it also governs the
import and export of hazardous waste.' 9' Through RCRA, regulatory power
is granted to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to control all
pollution from hazardous and non-hazardous wastes.', RCRA was
intended to regulate hazardous waste material throughout its entire life cycle
- from the time of generation, through its transportation, to its final
disposal.' 93 However, courts have frustrated this objective by refusing to
apply RCRA extraterritorially.' 94 Thus, RCRA is said to apply "only from
cradle to shore." 19
RCRA provides government regulation over hazardous waste. 96 It also
allows citizen suits.197 Although RCRA's citizen suit provision provides
which was simultaneously being shipped to Canada.
187 Id. at 844-45.
188 Id. at 845.
18 Id. at 849.
190 42 U.S.C.S. SS 6901-6992(k) (2002).
191 Martha E. Candiel lo, Symposium, Fifty-SeventhJudicial Conference of the Third Circuit: Looking
Forward to the Next Millenium: The Extraterritorial Reach of Environmental Laws, 70 TEM. L. REv. 1235,1235-
36 (Winter, 1997).
192 Levy, supra note 6, at 87.
193 Id.
194 Raikan, supra note 29, at 576.
195 Id.
1% 42 U.S.C. SS 6911-6917 (2002).
197 42 U.S.C. SS 6972(a)-(g) (2002);
Citizen suits in environmental law allow private enforcement of a statute, either against a
polluter in cases where the government has failed to prosecute or against the EPA for failure
to perform non-discretionary duties. Plaintiffs in citizen suits [under RCRA] can recover
damages upon a finding that the defendant contributed to the mishandling of hazardous
wastes which "present an imminent and substantial endangerment" to health or the
environment.
Raikan, supra note 29, at 578-79.
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citizens the right to sue the EPA for failure to perform a non-discretionary
duty, this type of suit has never been brought successfully. 98
The singular case addressing the extraterritoriality of RCRA is Amlon
Metals, Inc. v. FMC.'99 InAmlon Metals, FMC's pesticide plant in Baltimore,
Maryland, created waste containing copper, which it then contracted to be
sent to a United Kingdom recycling company for recovery. 2°° Some time
after the initial entrance into the contract, FMC sent twenty containers
holding the waste to the United Kingdom.2°' Upon delivery in Leeds,
England, the receiving company's personnel noticed a strong odor
emanating from the containers.2 2 After multiple indications by FMC that
the waste might contain varying amounts of xylene, Amlon rejected the
containers remaining at the port, and demanded FMC remove the
containers which had already been brought to the Amlon facility.2
3
Thereafter, Amlon notified the British government, which then conducted
its own tests, revealing high levels of xylene (higher than FMC ever
admitted previously), organic chemicals, and chlorinated phenols. 2°
Amlon originally sued FMC in the U.K's Commercial Court, where
it was dismissed because "all the actions claimed to be taken by FMC took
place in the United States and U.S. law would apply."2°s Subsequently,
Amlon sued in U.S. federal court under RCRA, the Alien Torts Claims Act,
strict liability, breach of express and implied warranty, and negligence.2°
The court quickly disposed of the Alien Tort claim on the premise that "the
matter failed to meet the preliminary jurisdictional requirement of...
violat[ing] a treaty or the law of nations. "2°7
The court, assuming RCRA would have to be applied extraterritorially,
accepted jurisdiction under RCRA, but declined to apply it, stating that
there is a presumption against the extraterritorial application of laws, and to
overcome that presumption requires congressional intent.2 8 "Having
examined the relevant legislative history and structure and language of
RCRA, this Court is unpersuaded by [the] plaintiffs' [contention] Congress
198 Lisa T. Beienky, Cradle to Border: U.S. Hazardous Waste Export Regulations and International Law,
17 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAw 95, 113 (1999).
199 Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
2 Id. at 669.
201 Id.
202 Id.
M Id. at 669-70.
M4 Id. at 670.
205 Id.
20 Id.
207 Raikan, supra note 29, at 581.
2N Belenky, supra note 198, at 115.
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desired RCRA['s citizen suit provision] to apply extraterritorially."2°9
Consequently, absent the court finding Congress's express or implied intent
for RCRA to apply extraterritorially, the plaintiff attempted to parallel their
claims to those often found in securities cases, i.e. where extraterritorial
application is warranted under the conduct test.210 The court found this
argument to be without merit, and dismissed the RCRA claims, leaving only
the contract claims remaining.21'
It is "this type of conclusion, where no court accepts or can find
jurisdiction, that, in a sense, eviscerates [a] statute that has been used to
argue in favor" of the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.212
Additionally, this case of first impression "brought to light a dangerous
loophole in the regulation of hazardous waste and its transnational
shipment."213 Thus, although foreign plaintiffs may use RCRA as a means
to bring suit against MNCs, according to the statute's language, at least one
court has indicated the impossibility of this.
1. COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
& LIABILITY ACT (CERCLA) 214
CERCLA contains express and implied provisions regarding a foreign
party's right to legal relief.215 Section 9611 expressly grants a limited cause
of action for foreign plaintiffs, allowing them to sue if:
1. the release of a hazardous substance occurred
A. in the navigable waters of the United States, or
B. in or on the territorial sea or adjacent shoreline of a foreign
country of which the claimant is a resident;
2. the claimant is not otherwise compensated for his loss,
3. the hazardous substance was released from a facility or from a
vessel located adjacent to or within the navigable waters...; and
4. recovery is authorized by a treaty or executive agreement be-
tween the United States and foreign country involved, or if the...
209 Amlon, 775 F.Supp. at 676.
210 Id. at 672-73.
211 Id. at 676.
212 Candiello, supra note 191, at 1236.
213 Raikan, supra note 29, at 614.
214 42 U.S.C.S. § 9601-9675(c) (2002).
215 Levy, supra note 6, at 90.
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appropriate official certifies that such country provides a comparable
remedy for U.S. claimants.216
Section 9607 demonstrates an unconditional implied extraterritoriality,
stating.
[N]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject
only to the defenses set forth in.. . this section... any person [who
owned or operated] a vessel or facility... at which.., hazardous
substances were disposed... or any person who [contracted to
dispose, treat, or transport] hazardous substances owned or
possessed by [the owner or operator of a facility] ... from which
there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the
incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be
liable for . . . costs of response incurred by any other party
[including the United States], as well as damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources... and the costs of any
health assessment. 217
Section 9611 "shows congressional intent to give CERCLA limited
application outside the territory of the United States, [as foreign claimants]
are limited to the scenarios set forth in the provision. '"2 " Nevertheless, the
two sections have complementary roles, allowing foreign parties "limited
legal relief under Section 9607, unless they meet the restrictions of Section
9611. .29
No court has ruled specifically on the extraterritorial applicability of
CERCLA. 0 However, in United States v. Ivey,221 the court came close to
addressing the question while considering the extraterritorial enforcement
of subpoenas issued under the act.222 In Ivey, after the EPA cleaned a
Superfund site in Michigan, it sought "cost recovery against a Canadian
defendant who was alleged to have owned and operated the [cleanup]
site."23 The EPA served the defendant in Canada. 224 He admitted to
receiving the subpoena, but argued "service was not valid because the
216 42 U.S.C.S. S 9611(l) (2002).
217 42 U.S.C.S. S 9607(a) (2002).
218 Levy, supra note 6, at 90-1.
219 Id.
220 Candiello, supra note191, at 1235.
221 United States v. Ivey, 747 F.Supp. 1235 (E.D. Mich. 1990).
222 Candiello, supra note 191, at 1235.
223 Id.
224 1,j
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nationwide service of process provisions of CERCLA did not extend to
Canada."22  The court agreed, but then examined the Michigan long-arm
statute, stating the defendant "had sufficient ties with Michigan to warrant
limited personal jurisdiction. " "26 The court entered a default judgment
against the defendant, which was later enforced by the Canadian Court of
Justice, possibly constituting "the first time a non-U.S. court has enforced
ajudgment for CERCLA cost recovery.""'
2. ToxIc SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT (TSCA)128
TSCA grants the EPA the authority to regulate the development and
production of chemicals that may present unreasonable health risks.2"
Although the issue of its extraterritoriality has never been addressed by a
court, per se, the Environmental Health Coalition (EHC) did test its
implications on plants in Mexico.23° When it discovered evidence that the
bank of the New River, which runs between Mexico and the U.S., was
being contaminated by maquiladoras, 2 ' the EHC filed a petition with the
EPA under the TSCA.21 2  In it, they alleged that "the EPA had the
jurisdiction and extraterritorial authority to address violations of improper
management of chemical substances by U.S. owned maquiladoras operating
in the Border Region."233 The EHC premised its petition on the theory that
U.S. parent corporations operating in Mexico were responsible for "illegally
dumping hazardous chemicals into the New River," and thus, were illegally
transporting and importing hazardous substances under the TSCA.2' The
petition was eventually withdrawn as part of a settlement agreement, but not
before the EPA issued over ninety subpoenas to U.S. companies "requiring
responses to significant internal operational and scientific inquiries.
"235
2 Id.
226 Id.
27 Id.
228 15 U.S.C.S. SS 2601-2692 (2002).
2 Jack I. Garvey, A New Evolution for Fast-Tracking Trade Agreements: Managing Enif'ronmental and
Labor Standards Through Extraterritorial Regulation, 5 UCLAJ. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 1, 39 (2000).
230 Elia V. Pirozzi, Compliance ThroughAliance: Regulatory Reform and theApplication ofMarket-Based
Incentives to the United States-Mexico Border Region Hazardous Waste Problem, 12 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 337,
364 (1997).
231 Maquiladoras are companies or factories situated on the border between the United States
and Mexico.
232 Pirozzi, supra note 230, at 364.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 364-65.
235 Id. at 365. The subpoenas achieved the primary goal of the EHC, which was to ascertain
information concerning the materials used and disposed of in the industrial operations of the
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3. MARINE MAMMALS PROTECTION ACT (MMPA) 2 6
The MMPA was enacted to reduce the number of incidental dolphin
killings in commercial fishing operations .237' However, it is perhaps most
well known for inciting the U.S.-Mexico dolphin-tuna conflict. The
MMPA limits the number of dolphins American fisherman can take, and
"imposes an obligation on each country that exports fish to the U.S. to
demonstrate it has a regulatory program governing the taking of marine
mammals that is comparable to [the MMPA].' 38 The provision that caused
the tuna controversy included a requirement that the U.S. place a trade
embargo against countries unable to make the required showing.
239
However, two decades prior, an important clarification of the
extraterritoriality principle for an environmental statute was made in United
States v. Mitchell.24° Here, the court reversed the criminal conviction of an
American under the MMPA for capturing dolphins within three miles of
the Bahamas.241 The court noted Congress's ability to reach beyond U.S.'
territory and dictate the action of its citizens; however, Congress must first
explicitly state its intention to do so in the statute.242 The court held the
MMPA "was firmly grounded in the recognition of a sovereign's power to
regulate the natural resources within its territorial jurisdiction, which
operated against an extraterritorial application of the Act," thereby
overruling the conviction.243
After the General Agreement on Tarriffs and Trade (GATT) was signed,
Earth Island Institute, an NGO, sued the Secretary of State, asking that he
be required to enforce an embargo against all tuna products not certified as
dolphin safe.2" Consequently, the U.S. banned the importation of tuna
from several countries, including Mexico, costing the Mexican tuna industry
between $30 and $57 million each year. 245 Mexico filed a retaliatory suit,
Maquiladora factories.
236 16 U.S.C.S. §5 1361-1421(h) (2002).
237 Stanley M. Spracker, Sovereignty and the Regulation of International Business in the Environmental
Area: An American Viewpoint, 20 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 225, 227 (1994).
238 Id.
239 Id.
240 United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977).
241 Twenhafel, supra note 68, at 307.
242 Id.
243 Id.
24 Carol J. Miller &Jennifer L. Croston, W1FO Scrutiny v. Environmental Objectives: Assessment of
the International Dolphin Conservation Program Act, 37 AM. Bus. L.J. 73, 99 (Fall, 1999).
245 Id.
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requesting a GATT panel settle the dispute as to whether the embargo was
inconsistent with several different provisions of the agreement.24
The panel concluded the U.S. was in violation of the GATT, and the
embargo had to be lifted.247 Their reasoning was essentially based on the
language of the agreement that indicated any extraterritorial application of
laws not specifically addressed in the agreement had to be necessary; e.g.
those protecting human life or healthy.24  The opinion was criticized on
many levels. Environmentalists thought the decision's implications were
too broad, and had "dropped a wide net over decades of environmental
treaties and laws."249 Others criticized the MMPA for its extraterritoriality
in general, although this argument is often met with disagreement. 
2
M
As indicated by its complicated history, the MMPA is considered by
some to have extraterritorial effects; it is considered by others to not.
V. OBSTACLES FOREIGN PLAINTIFFS FACE
"Although courtroom doors are cracking open, numerousjurisdictional
and other barriers remain for lawsuits brought by foreign claimants against
U.S. MNCs in U.S. courts."25' These barriers include dismissal for forum
non conveniens and/or comity.
A. Forum Non Conveniens
Even when courts find subject matterjurisdiction, foreign plaintiffs still
stand for dismissal based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
252
"Claims brought by foreign plaintiffs are routinely rejected by U.S. courts"
based on this doctrine. z 3 Forum non conveniens is promulgated through
246 Id.
247 Peter Hayes, Book Note, Freer Trade, Protected Environment, 35 COLUM.J. TRANSNAT'L L. 213,
240(1997).
248 Id.
249 Steve Charnovitz, Trade and the Environment: The Environment vs. Trade Rules: Defogging the
Debate, 25 ENvrL. L. 475, 481-82 (Winter, 1992).
250 Id. at 496.
251 Armin Rosencranz & Richard Campbell, Foreign Environmental and Human Rights Suits Against
U.S. Corporations in U.S. Courts, 18 STAN. ENvrL. L.J. 145, 146 (June, 1999).
252 Joanna E. Arlow, Note, The Utility of ATCA and the "Law of Nations" in Environmental Torts
Litigation: Jota v. Texaco, Inc. and Large Scale Environmental Destruction, 7 Wis. ENVTL. L. J. 93, 132
(Winter, 2000).
253 Garvey, supra note 229, at 27.
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common law, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 254 The doctrine
provides courts with a means to decline jurisdiction when it believes the
case could be "more appropriately or conveniently tried elsewhere."
255
Courts are afforded broad discretion to dismiss an action, which is applied
frequently to ,preclude foreign claimants from using the "procedural
advantages presently available to U.S. plaintiffs bringing suit against U.S.
corporations."
25 6
A dismissal under forum non conveniens typically leaves the victim the
option of filing suit in another forum.25 7 Appellate courts have limited
review power, as the decision may only be reversed upon a finding of a clear
abuse of discretion. Forum non conveniens is intended to be used as a
means to eliminate harassing, vexatious suits, while advancing the
"convenience and interests of both the parties and the forum."2 9 Only the
defendant may invoke the doctrine of forum non conveniens, and MNCs
in the U.S. "constitute the main group of defendants who currently benefit
from the doctrine."26° MNCs frequently are able to evade liability under the
doctrine, as the suit is rarely filed in the alternative forum.26' However, by
2" Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 251, at 180.
.255 Id.
256 Brooke Clagett, Comment, Forum Non Conveniens in International Environmental Tort Suits:
Closing the Doors of U.S. Courts to Foreign Plaintiffs, 9 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 513, 516 (Summer, 1996).
257 Rosencranz & Campbell, supra note 251, at 180.
258 Garvey, supra note 229, at 27.
2S9 Jacqueline Duval-Major, Note, One-Way Ticket Home: The Federal Doctrine of Forum Non
Conveniens and the International Plaintiff, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 650, 653 (Mar. 1992).
260 Id. at 651.
261 Id.
A foreign plaintiff may be unable to bring the suit in the alternative forum for a
variety of reasons. Plaintiffs may lose their United States attorney, either because of the
alternative forum's specific professional requirements or because the attorney cannot afford
the time and expense of travelling to a foreign country for trial. Even if plaintiffs can find an
attorney to represent them in the alternative forum, many countries do not allow fees payable
on a contingency basis. In addition, many plaintiffs cannot afford attorneys on retainer,
especially since some countries cap tort awards, which further limits plaintiffs' recovery.
Moreover, differences in procedural law may preclude refiling the suit. The
foreign country's statute of limitations may have expired during the forum non conveniens
inquiry in the United States. In addition, a foreign forum may not provide discovery rules as
liberal as those in the United States. Although manyjudges now make forum non conveniens
dismissals conditional on the defendant waiving procedural prohibitions, such as the relevant
statute of limitations, jurisdiction, or restrictive discovery rules of the foreign country, this
is generally not enough to ensure that the plaintiffs will obtainjustice in their home countries.
Political pressures may affect the plaintiffs and the court system, especially if the defendant
MNC exerts great economic power in the country. Finally, plaintiffs simply may not want
to endure the costs and inconvenience of starting a new trial.
Id. at 671-72.
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granting forum non conveniens dismissals in a wide variety of cases,
"United States courts are tacitly condoning the potentially hazardous
activities of MNCs by allowing injured plaintiffs' claims to go
unanswered."2 62 Furthermore, forum non conveniens "acts largely as a
barrier to holding U.S. multinational corporations accountable for their
environmentally destructive behavior abroad. 263
1. GULF OIL CoRP. v. GILBERT 2 64
Two cases set forth the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The first is
Gilbert, in which a Virginia resident sued a New York corporation from
damages arising from an explosion.265 The doctrine of forum non
conveniens was originally used in state courts,266 but in Gilbert, the Supreme
Court recognized its application to the federal system. The Court described
a test to be used when determining whether a motion for dismissal should
be granted under forum non conveniens. 267  The first prong took into
consideration whether there was an adequate alternative forum.268 Then the
court considered the private269 and public27 ° interests involved .271 After
taking into account all of these factors, a balancing test was applied.2 72 The
Court indicated unless the balance of these factors is strongly in favor of the
defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.273
262 Id. at 673.
263 Clagett, supra note 256, at 516.
264 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
265 Id. at 502-03.
266 Forum non conveniens began as a method of transferring cases from state to federal court
when a federal question was involved. Id. at n.4.
267 Id. at 508.
268 Id.
269 Id. The court suggested the private factors to be considered are: the relative ease of access to
sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, cost of
obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, possibility of view of the premises if that be appropriate, and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive. Id.
Z70 Id. at 508-09. Further, the public factors to be considered are: the undesirability of piling up
litigation in congested centers, the burden ofjury duty on people of a community having no relation to
the litigation, the local interest in having localized controversies decided at home and the unnecessary
injection of problems in conflict of laws. Id.
71 Id.
272 Id. at 508.
273 Id.
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2. PIpER AIRCRAFT Co. V. REy O
27 4
PiperAircraft is the second leading case regarding the doctrine of forum
non conveniens, and is often cited for supporting dismissals of suits brought
by foreign plaintiffs against MNCs.27s In Piper Aircraft, Scottish plaintiffs
sued an American corporation for its involvement in an airplane crash that
took place in Scotland. 6 Piper Aircraft indicates foreign plaintiffs are to be
given less deference to their forum selection than domestic plaintiffs,
particularly when they are filing suit in a specific court due to differences in
the substantive law that would be applied. 27" The Court explained that
plaintiffs are able to elect a forum whose choice-of-law rules are most
advantageous to them, thus "if the possibility of an unfavorable change in
substantive law is given substantial weight in the forum non conveniens
inquiry, dismissal would rarely be proper."27' The Court did not mean,
however, that the possibility of unfavorable substantive law should never be
considered.2 79 "Ifthe remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable
change in law may be given substantial weight; the district court may
conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests ofjustice." 280
According to PiperAircraft, an adequate alternative forum is not required;
the only thing necessary is that the "defendant be amenable to service in the
alternative forum it proposes."28' The result of PiperAircraft's holding is that
"alternative fora have been considered adequate in the absence of 'rare
circumstances,"' or if the remedy is "so clearly inadequate or unsatisfactory
that it is no remedy at all," which has worked to the severe detriment of
foreign plaintiffs.282
A stricter standard of forum non conveniens would limit the MNCs'
evasion of responsibility for their actions.2s3 Because the United States has
an interest in preserving the global environment, and because it has a moral
274 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
Z75 Garvey, supra note 229, at 29.
Z76 PiperAircrafi, 454 U.S. at 238-39.
M" Id. at 238, 243. This is slightly inapposite to Gilbert, which produced more preferential
treatment for the plaintiff than the Piper Aircraft Court afforded.
Z7' Id. at 250.
77 Clagett, supra note 256, at 521.
2W PiperAircraft, 454 U.S. at 255.
' Arlow, supra note 252, at 133. Again, a stricter standard was applied here than in Gilbert,
making it more difficult for foreign plaintiffs to avoid dismissal.
Mp Id.
2Wi Duval-Major, supra note 259, at 673.
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interest in controlling the behavior of domestic corporations in developing
nations, the doctrine of forum non conveniens should be relaxed or
abandoned in cases involving suits by foreign plaintiffs against U.S.
corporations for environmental injuries suffered in foreign countries.2 8
While this simple change in doctrine will not completely solve the problems
foreign plaintiffs face when suing MNCs, "it is preferable to the present
system in which multinational corporations are able to recklessly destroy the
natural environment in developing nations without fear of judicial
reproach. "285
B. Comity
United States courts have extended their jurisdiction to allow
adjudication of disputes that meet an intent, conduct, or effects test,2 6 as set
out in Massey. Satisfaction of any of these tests "establishes that the acts in
dispute sufficiently affect U.S. interests and therefore warrant exporting and
applying U.S. law."2 7 However, in order to balance the "negative response
from foreign nations encountering this encroachment by U.S. courts,
principles of comity must also be weighed."281 Comity is "the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons
who are under the protection of its laws."2 9 The result is the same under
comity as "when forum non conveniens is the talisman - application of the
doctrine ... leads to dismissal."m As the Ninth Circuit noted, "Comity is
not [a] dispositive [factor] because if it were, it would always prevent suit
[by] foreigners in United States courts. ", 29' Nonetheless, the doctrine of
comity has led to the dismissal of a number of cases brought by foreign
plaintiffs against U.S. corporate defendants.'
2P Clagett, supra note 256, at 534.
285 Id. at 517.
' Raikan, supra note 29, at 611.
2~7 Id.
2 Id.
Levy, supra note 6, at 84-85.
W Garvey, supra note 229, at 31.
291 Id.
292 TA
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1. ToRREs v. SouTHERN PERU COPPER C0.293
For example, in Torres, Peruvian citizens filed suit against a MNC in
U.S. federal court for environmental injuries the companies inflicted in
Peru. The government of Peru had participated substantially in the
activities at issue, through granting various licenses, and via extensive
regulation of the subject industries. 2 It asserted the extraterritorial
application of U.S. environmental statutes would undermine the
government's ability to conduct its own internal affairs. 2 5 The court agreed
with the government and affirmed the lower court's dismissal on grounds
of comity.296 The opinion did not offer a detailed explanation of the
decision, other than reflecting the court's belief that the infringement on the
Peruvian government outweighed the U.S. interest in environmental
protection.2
2. JOTA V. TExAcO 298
A counterexample isJota, in which residents of Ecuador filed suit against
a U.S. corporation for allegedly dumping toxic substances into local rivers,
contaminating local property, and for the physical injuries resulting
therefrom.299 The Ecuadorian government initially objected to the lawsuit,
but after a change in the control of the government, reversed its position,
declaring the U.S. was the proper forum. °° The lower court dismissed the
suit on the basis of comity, failure to join an indispensable party (the
Ecuadorian government), and forum non conveniens.3 ' The Second
Circuit reversed the ruling, stating the government's participation would be
dependent on its waiver of sovereign immunity, which it had not clearly
done at that time.3 2 Furthermore, the dismissal based on forum non
conveniens and comity was erroneous, as there was nothing requiring
Texaco to submit to jurisdiction in Ecuadorian courts.3 3 Thus, the court
S Torres v. S. Peru Copper Co., 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997).
294 Id. at 543.
295 Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "International Comity, 83 IOWA L. REV. 893, 894 (Aug. 1998).
2 Torres, 113 F.3d at 544.
2W Ramsey, supra note 295, at 895.
M' Jota v. Texaco, 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
2W9 Id. at 155-56.
30 Id. at 157.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 163.
3W Id. at 155.
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looked to whether an alternative forum was available not only in
determining whether the forum was proper, but also whether comity would
outweigh the plaintiffs interests.
VI. CONCLUSION
Suing MNCs in U.S. courts has presented a difficult problem for courts
and plaintiffs alike. However, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court
and the D.C. Circuit court have not completely barred the application, and
have provided insight into its environmental uses. The three exceptions
presented in Massey provide insight into what a successful suit against a
MNC by a foreign plaintiff would require. Primarily, if the plaintiff could
prove that decisions pertaining to the act in question took place in the
United States, the location of conduct exception would apply. The plaintiffs
might also try to prove some sort of harm felt in the United States, which
would invoke the seriousness of the harm exception. Finally, as Congress
has done so in the past, and is clearly able to do so in the future, it is possible
an environmental statute might be drafted with a clear intent to be applied
extraterritorially. Assuming foreign plaintiffs can overcome jurisdictional
issues, and other problems, such as forum non-conveniens and comity, the
world of litigation may soon be available as a remedy to environmental
harms suffered at the hands of MNCs.
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